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The Basque Country, a region along the Spanish-Franco border, has a long history of 
independence and autonomy. In the modern era, from 1959 until 2011, the domestic terrorist 
group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) waged a campaign of political violence primarily 
concentrated in the Basque Autonomous Community in pursuit of the region’s independence 
from Spain. The group was ultimately unsuccessful and declared a permanent ceasefire in 2011. I 
analyze the important political and economic factors that contributed to ETA’s prolonged 
existence. In the economy, high youth unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s created a large 
pool of recruits that helped sustain ETA’s campaign. At the same time, ETA’s activities 
reinforced negative economic performance by damaging the region’s economy. 
Basque nationalist political parties also pushed for independence from Spain but sought 
to do so through established political processes. Despite being officially distinct entities, the 
“nationalist left” tacitly accepted ETA’s violence for many years and viewed the group as the 
military wing of the nationalist movement. This support eroded over time as ETA hampered 
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nationalist parties’ ability to further their goals and the electorate’s opposition to the group grew. 
Ultimately, a loss of support among nationalist left parties led to ETA’s demise and declaration 
of a ceasefire. Since the ceasefire in 2011, there has been increased support for the nationalist left 
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ETA  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom) 
PNV  Basque Nationalist Party 
PSOE  Spanish Socialist Workers Party 
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Note on the term “nationalist” – In the context of the Spanish Civil War, General Franco’s 
forces are often referred to as “Nationalists.” I refer to advocates for Basque independence as 
“Basque nationalists” in this thesis. To avoid any confusion in this paper, “nationalist” will only 
be used to refer to those that favor Basque independence. 
 
Note on place names – For the names of provinces, cities, and towns in the Basque Country, I 
use the Spanish name with the Basque name included in parentheses after first use. I use Spanish 




The Basque Country is a region along the modern-day, Spanish-Franco border with a 
proud history of independence and autonomy. Most Basque territory lies in the Southern Basque 
Country in modern-day Spain. That said, Basque identity is distinct from the rest of the country. 
During Roman, Muslim, and Christian times, the region maintained some degree of autonomy 
including its own legal and tax system. This history has formed the basis of a unique Basque 
identity. 
Following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Spain came under the rule of Francisco 
Franco’s military dictatorship. The Basque Country had been part of the Spanish kingdom and 
republic prior to the war and became part of this dictatorship as well. Franco’s rule lasted until 
1975, and the memory of defeat and suffering in the war lingered among Basque nationalists that 
had favored independence even prior to the war and dictatorship. In 1959, young nationalists 
came together to form Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA), a 
group that began a campaign of political violence against the Franco regime. Despite Spain’s 
transition to democracy from 1975-1980, ETA continued its terrorist attacks in pursuit of Basque 
independence from Spain. After decades of fighting, the group declared a permanent ceasefire in 
2011. They formally disbanded in 2018. 
The Southern Basque Country thus remains a part of Spain, leaving ETA’s mission 
unfulfilled. But aside from the extreme goal of independence, what did ETA do to the Basque 
region? Domestic terrorism is a severe disruption to a stable society and impacts all facets of life. 
Throughout this thesis, I aim to analyze how ETA affected the economy of Spain’s Basque 
Autonomous Community (BAC) as well as the region’s politics. I also examine the effects that 
7 
 
the economy and politics in the BAC had on the group over its lifetime. This analysis is done in 
part by looking at changes in these areas since the group’s ceasefire in 2011. Significant changes 
in one or both areas post-ceasefire would indicate that ETA’s absence was an important part in 
those developments. In this way, I seek to identify certain effects that ETA had on the Basque 
Autonomous Community. 
Literature Review 
Several important sources form the foundation of my research. In my discussion of the 
Basque economy, Mikel Gómez Uranga’s work, Basque Economy: From Industrialization to 
Globalization, provides much of the information I use in discussing Basque economic 
development. Uranga was a professor of applied economics at the University of the Basque 
Country, and though written in 2003, this comprehensive book charts the important 
developments in the Basque economy throughout the 20th century. Some data come from 
Uranga’s book, but most of the data on unemployment and GDP come from governmental 
sources, namely Spain’s National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE) and 
the Basque Statistics Institute (Instituto Vasco de Estadística, Eustat). Public opinion data comes 
from the University of the Basque Country’s Euskobarómetro poll.  
I also reference several sources that relate to economic determinants and effects of 
terrorism. Several sources that form the basis for this analysis are Raul Caruso and Friedrich 
Schneider (2011), Thomas Gries, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks (2011), Erik Cruz, 
Steward J. D’Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg (2018), Aniruddha Bagchi and Jomon A. Paul 
(2018), and Adesoji Adelaja and Justin George (2020). Another important source is “The 
Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country” by Alberto Abadie and Javier 
Gardeazabal—researchers from Harvard University and the University of the Basque Country, 
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respectively. This article is one of the earliest attempts to quantify ETA’s economic impact on 
the Basque Autonomous Community and forms an important basis for my thesis. Similar work 
has been spearheaded by Mikel Buesa of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and I 
reference his findings in this thesis as well. For data on ETA’s activities, I use the Global 
Terrorism Database run by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism at the University of Maryland. 
For historical background, I reference A Concise History of Spain: Second Edition by two 
professors of history at the University of Minnesota. This 2016 book provides basic historical 
information for both the Basque Country and Spain. I also draw from several more detailed 
accounts of Basque history and ETA. Among them are the works of Javier Martín-Peña and 
Susan Opotow (2011), James K. Esser and Christine M. Bridges (2011), Fernando Molina 
(2014), Benjamín Tejerina (2015), Teresa Whitfield (2014, 2015), and Imanol Murua (2017). 
Tejerina, Murua, and Molina are all professors at the University of the Basque Country—
Tejerina in sociology, Murua in journalism, and Molina in contemporary history. Martín-Peña is 
a professor of social psychology at the University of Barcelona, and Opotow is a professor of 
sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. Esser and 
Bridges are professors of psychology and English and modern languages, respectively, at Lamar 
University. Whitfield has worked at the UN and other international bodies on humanitarian 
issues. 
Whitfield, Murua, and Tejerina all seek to analyze the process of ETA’s end. Whitfield’s 
account provides a comprehensive history of ETA and the process that brought about its 
ceasefire. She identifies multiple factors on the road to peace such as “counterterrorism and the 
activism of civil society, changes set in motion within ETA’s political base after the collapse of 
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[the] peace process in 2007, and limited but essential assistance by international actors” 
(“Difficulties of Ending” 1). Murua seeks to build on Whitfield’s work by focusing on her 
understanding of ETA’s ceasefire as the result of a political process. He argues that the view that 
ETA simply suffered a military defeat is too simplistic. He further argues that a loss of support 
for the group among its nationalist left base of support was a key factor in bringing about the 
2011 ceasefire. Tejerina also argues that a lack of internal cohesion on the nationalist left played 
an important role in ETA’s end, as those on the nationalist left increasingly questioned the 
political-military strategy for independence. 
The existing scholarship on the Basque Country and ETA focuses on the factors that 
motivated the group and those that led to its decline, and these authors are especially interested 
in the role of support for ETA on the nationalist left. I incorporate the role of economic factors in 
my analysis of ETA to expand upon this scholarship and create a more comprehensive 
understanding of the group. The Basque economy is rarely referenced in works relating to ETA. 
I bring these two areas together because, though often seen as separate topics, they are closely 
related to and complement each other. I also look at the period since ETA’s ceasefire. Much has 
been written about the rise and fall of ETA, but there is less discussion of developments in 
Basque nationalism since 2011. I identify changes that have occurred in the politics and 
economy of the Basque Autonomous Community since the ceasefire. These changes occurred in 
a world without ETA, and they thus provide some insight into what effects ETA had on society 
during its campaign. 
Findings 
I find that the economic conditions in the Basque Country were an important factor in 
maintaining ETA’s campaign. Strong ideological and political motivations, rather than poor 
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economic performance, led to the creation of the group. But a struggling economy in the last 
quarter of the 20th century contributed to ETA’s longevity. High levels of youth unemployment 
created a large pool of potential ETA recruits. As unemployment fell in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, we see a decrease in ETA’s activity in part due to this decrease of available recruits. I also 
find that ETA had a negative impact on the Basque economy, in both direct financial effects and 
indirect effects of depressing economic growth. 
Nationalist political parties were heavily involved in the end of ETA. After failed peace 
talks in 2006, ETA found itself lacking the tacit support it previously had among the nationalist 
left. Ultimately, the nationalist left’s loss of enthusiasm for ETA pushed the group to disarm. 
ETA’s impact on political parties is evident as well. The nationalist left achieved more electoral 
success after ETA’s ceasefire than before. And minority parties of the nationalist left tended to 
do worse when ETA escalated violence or broke a ceasefire. 
I detail these points after first explaining my research methodology and providing a more 
detailed historical background of the Basque Country and ETA. In sum, the Basque economy 
and body politic both had an impact on ETA, and the group had effects on them as well. I 
identify what these impacts were by analyzing developments in the economic and political 




This thesis aims to understand how the terrorist group, ETA, affected and was affected by 
economic development and political changes in the Basque Country. I take a historical and data-
driven approach, looking at how certain indicators have changed over time, to explain the 
relationship between the economy, political change, and ETA.  
I look at data to compare the Basque Country with Spain to assess how the economy of 
the region has changed before and after ETA’s campaign. I examine the unemployment rate and 
measures of GDP to do so. I also look at what sectoral shifts have occurred in the Basque 
economy. The aim of this analysis is to see how the economic development of the region 
changed because of ETA’s ceasefire and how much of a role the same development played in 
bringing about the ceasefire.  
Political indicators provide valuable insight into Basque politics and the Basque 
nationalist movement. I examine the electoral results for Basque political parties in both BAC 
and national elections since Spain’s transition to democracy. I seek to relate these data to the 
history of changes in BAC political parties’ responses to ETA: ceasefires, the Pact of Ajuria-
Enea, the Pact of Lizarra, and the Ibarretxe Plan. Finally, I examine the specific changes after 




2.1 The Basque Country 
Spain, for most of history, did not exist as the single geopolitical entity we are familiar 
with today. Like most of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula on which Spain now sits was home to 
various kingdoms that often warred with each other. For a nearly 800-year period, a large portion 
of modern-day Spain was conquered by Muslims. In the late fifteenth century, the Christian 
kingdoms of Castile and Aragon were united by the marriage of Queen Isabel and King 
Fernando, creating the earliest recognizable “Spain” (Phillips and Phillips 108). In 1492, they 
brought the centuries-long rule of the Muslims to an end when they conquered the last Muslim 
city of Granada (Phillips and Phillips 61). Despite the creation of this early Spanish state, distinct 
regional differences remained across the peninsula due to the nature of the diverse groups that 
lived there. 
This regional variance in Iberia is reflected in Spain’s constitutional monarchy today, 
which divides Spain into 17 administrative divisions called “autonomous communities.” The 
Basque Country is now represented as one of these autonomous communities, and it stands out 
among all of Spain’s regions for many reasons. Situated along the Spanish-Franco border, the 
Basque Country historically extended beyond the current borders of the Basque Autonomous 
Community (BAC). Basque nationalists, therefore, claim the BAC, another Spanish autonomous 
community called Navarre, and the Northern Basque Country (part of modern-day France) as the 
true Basque Country. The focus of my thesis, however, is the Basque Autonomous Community 
because it is the hotbed of Basque nationalism and the area where most of ETA’s terrorist 
activity was concentrated. 
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The Basque people are unique in Europe for their long presence in their territory. No one 
knows when people first settled in the Basque Country, but the Basques are said to have been 
there for at least two thousand years. Their language has survived just as long, and it forms an 
important part of Basque identity. The Basque language (Euskera in Basque) is among the oldest 
spoken languages on Earth, predating all other Indo-European languages. It is unrelated to the 
language families that modern European languages belong to, and no one knows exactly where it 
originated. Basque intellectuals revived the language’s use in the 19th century, and it has been an 
important element of Basque nationalist identity ever since (Phillips and Phillips 4).  
The Basque Country also has a history of resisting the authority of outside powers. There 
is some debate on the matter, but it is commonly said that the Basque Country was the only part 
of the Iberian Peninsula that was not conquered by the Muslims. The Basques also made an 
agreement with the Roman empire to keep their own traditional system of laws and taxes when 
the Romans first settled Iberia (Esser and Bridges 61). It was not until the end of the Carlist wars 
in 1876 that the Basque Country was fully subjected to the authority of the Spanish kingdom and 
its traditional laws—or fueros—were revoked (Uranga 16). This long history of independence 
ultimately ending in the loss of the fueros is another building block of the identity drawn upon by 
the contemporary Basque nationalist movement. 
The Basque Country has remained a part of Spain ever since the end of the Carlist wars. 
An attempt at a republican government that included the Basque Country was made slightly 
earlier in 1873, but the government was factious and inefficient. A year later, as the third Carlist 
war was ongoing, the military intervened and dismissed the republic’s parliament. Ultimately, 
the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1876 (Phillips and Phillips 298). The new constitutional 
monarchy solidified the Basque Country’s place in Spain. This restoration hardly meant stability, 
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however. Spain continued to undergo tumultuous changes in government. The constitutional 
monarchy lasted until 1923 when General Miguel Primo de Rivera led a successful coup. He 
established a military dictatorship that lasted until 1930 (Phillips and Phillips 327). In 1931, 
Spanish intellectuals formed the country’s Second Republic. This republic lasted longer than the 
first, but it was also factious and would prove to be short lived. In 1936, a group of Spanish 
generals launched a coup against the Second Republic. The conflict between them and the 
republican government was the three-years-long Spanish Civil War. The republicans ultimately 
lost the war, and General Francisco Franco became Spain’s new military dictator. His regime 
ruled the country until his death in 1975. His dictatorship pushed for the “Spaniardization” of 
Spain, and actions were taken by the regime to suppress Basque culture and language. These 
would become a sore spot for Basque nationalists and an important driver in the creation of ETA. 
After Franco’s death, the exiled heir to the Spanish throne returned to the country, and Spain 
transitioned once more to a constitutional monarchy. That constitution is still in place today, and 
it governs the relationship of the Basque Autonomous Community with the Spanish state.  
This is a simplified summary of the long and detailed history of the Basque Country and 
Spain. Indeed, some scholars have recently challenged the prevailing narrative of Basque 
suffering at the hands of Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War. Fernando Molina has 
written extensively about Basque history, and in his article entitled “Lies of Our Fathers,” he 
challenges the mainstream narrative of Basque history. He makes it clear that Basque identity is 
far more complex than it is often depicted today (Molina 2). Before the Spanish Civil War, he 
argues, Basque nationalism was not a unifying cause within the Basque Country. Indeed, much 
of the Civil War’s conflict that occurred in the Basque region was between Basque Catholic 
traditionalists and Basque liberal republicans (Molina 4). Molina further disputes the common-
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held notion that the regime was particularly cruel towards Basques during the war and after its 
victory. He finds that the brutality of the dictatorship was directed toward former republicans 
because of their political views, not Basque nationalists (Molina 9). He further finds that levels 
of violence against civilians during the war were quite similar on both sides of the conflict 
(Molina 8). 
These discrepancies in the mainstream view of Basque history are important to 
acknowledge. They do not, however, make a large difference in the eventual rise of ETA. Molina 
acknowledges that, although there was possible exaggeration and falsehoods spread by Basque 
nationalists about the extent of Basque suffering during the Civil War, they were still able to 
mold the popular memory of the conflict to their liking (Molina 19, 21). The war was 
remembered as an ethnic conflict; Basques suffered at the hands of Spanish oppressors who 
targeted them. Molina argues that this shift in memory was made possible due to several factors. 
Chief among them, however, was the shared Catholicism and values of the traditionalists and the 
nationalists (Molina 12). Republicans were removed from the equation by Franco after the war, 
and the remaining two groups, that had previously been at odds, could now interact and move 
forward (Molina 12). The new memory they forged became the prevailing view of the conflict in 
Basque society. This nationalism emphasized Basque culture, language, and shared suffering in 
the war and post-war. This view, and the resentment it fostered among the Basque populace, 
characterized the environment in which ETA was born. 
2.2 ETA 
Second-generation Basque nationalists were frustrated by the lack of active response to 
the Civil War and dictatorship from their parents (“Difficulties of Ending” 2). Motivated by the 
desire for revenge over past injustices, some of these young radicals decided to create a new 
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nationalist organization called Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom) in 
19591 (Molina 19). Commonly referred to by its acronym, ETA, the group’s objective was 
independence from Spain. Initially there were multiple factions within ETA, but by the group’s 
fifth assembly in 1966, the military wing had become the dominant force (Endgame for ETA 42). 
A splinter group, ETA-pm (politico-military), acted separately from ETA-m (military) for a few 
years, but they declared a ceasefire in 1981 (Endgame for ETA 55). With the military wing in 
control, the group focused on achieving independence from Spain through political violence. 
From 1968 to 2011, ETA committed over 2,000 attacks, killing over 800 people (Global 
Terrorism Database). The memory of defeat and oppression following the Spanish Civil War 
were the key motivators for the group. Franco’s policies in the period of his rule from 1939-1975 
were motivators as well. Franco embarked on a campaign to solidify the unity of Spain, and he 
saw it as a necessity to eliminate minority languages and cultures to do so. The regime 
“prohibited the use of Euskera [the Basque language] in public […] and in all religious activities, 
closed the only university, raided libraries and burned books” (Endgame for ETA 40). The 
dictatorship also “confiscated property, imposed fines, fired teachers, closed businesses, and 
expropriated industries” in addition to persecuting members of the clergy in the Basque Country 
(Endgame for ETA 40). These acts created feelings of resentment and anger towards the regime. 
Franco spearheaded a severe incursion on Basque autonomy and represented a threat to the 
ideological, cultural, and economic fabric of Basque society.  
Following Franco’s death in 1975, Spain’s transition to democracy did not spell the end 
for ETA. The group continued its violent campaign for independence. In fact, they escalated 
their attacks under the new democracy because they “held Spanish democracy to be illegitimate, 
                                                 




Basque autonomy to be insufficient and concessions made to the Spanish right […] to be 
altogether unacceptable” (Endgame for ETA 25). Any hopes that ETA was fighting the 
dictatorship rather than for independence were dashed. The new Spanish government did, in a 
break from Franco’s regime, attempt to negotiate with ETA to establish peace in the region. 
Peace talks were held in 1988, 1995, 1998, and 2006, but none of them proved fruitful. 
Following the failed talks of 2006, however, there was a fundamental change in ETA’s ability to 
carry on its mission. They faced great difficulty in maintaining a high number of members.  
Following the failed talks, Spain “increased its pressure on ETA and the nationalist Left” 
(“Difficulties of Ending” 8). Twenty-three leaders of Batasuna (the political party with closest 
ties to ETA) were arrested in late 2007, and by the end of 2009, over 270 arrests of alleged ETA 
members had been made (“Difficulties of Ending” 8). The support for ETA on the nationalist left 
had also weakened. After so many years of conflict, nationalist political parties had hoped these 
talks would settle ETA’s violence once and for all. Questioning of ETA leadership had been 
brewing within Batasuna, and as Murua writes, “[t]he bombing of the Madrid airport in 
December 2006 while the ceasefire was still in force was the last straw regarding the loss of 
confidence in the leadership of ETA” (100). In 2008, Batasuna leaders held a meeting regarding 
the political-military strategy of the nationalist left (Murua 101). Questioning ETA’s role as the 
military wing of the nationalist movement was unprecedented, but nationalist parties had reached 
a turning point (Murua 101). They ultimately decided that ETA’s “leadership” of the nationalist 
left would no longer suffice. The political parties had to take charge if the movement were to 
survive. ETA was expected to follow their decision (Murua 102).  
In February of 2010, ETA decided to stop its armed activity (Murua 103). This was not 
publicly announced until that September (Murua 103). That same month, important Basque 
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figures gathered in Guernica to sign the Guernica declaration—demanding an ETA ceasefire 
(Murua 103).  The nationalist left’s decision had been made by the summer of 2010, and ETA 
was now in a de facto ceasefire (Endgame for ETA 225). In January of 2011, after 52 years of 
fighting, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire which was finalized in October (Murua 104). 
Spain made no concessions toward Basque independence in exchange, but the group upheld its 
ceasefire, nonetheless. The fight was over. In 2018, after seven years of ceasefire, ETA 
announced it would permanently disband. In their final statement, ETA apologized for the harm 
it had done, saying in part “[w]e want to show respect to the dead, the injured, and the victims 
that the ETA’s actions have caused. We are truly sorry” (ETA al pueblo vasco).  
The rest of this thesis explores the economic and political factors that played into both 
ETA’s longevity and ultimate failure. In analyzing the Basque economy, I observe trends in 
overall development as well as statistics for unemployment and GDP. I link high youth 
unemployment to ETA’s ability to recruit new members and endure for many years. I also 
examine the detrimental effects ETA’s terrorism had on the Basque economy. Politically, I look 
at both the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the nationalist left. I examine electoral outcomes 
as well as different strategies the parties adopted towards ETA over the years. In both areas, but 






3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ETA 
3.1 Introduction 
Spain’s transition to democracy began with Franco’s death in 1975. The new constitution 
and statute of autonomy for the Basque Country afforded the region far greater autonomy than it 
had under Franco, and it ended the dictator’s oppression of Basque culture. Basque became a co-
official language along with Spanish, and Basque culture could flourish once again. The Basque 
Autonomous Community was even afforded some privileges in its statute of autonomy that no 
other Spanish region has. The BAC has a police force under the autonomous community’s 
control and its own tax system (Uranga 63, 69).  Despite these changes, ETA continued its 
campaign for several more decades. Far from bringing an end to their campaign, their violence 
intensified in the first decades of democracy. 
As I have discussed, a history of independence, memory of suffering during the Spanish 
Civil War, and cultural oppression under the Franco regime were motivations for ETA’s 
founding. I argue, however, that economic factors contributed to ETA’s continued existence over 
many years. Given the long duration of ETA’s campaign, the group also had lasting effects on 
the BAC’s economy. I discuss these effects on the BAC economy, primarily focusing on the 
impact of ETA’s terrorism on BAC GDP and growth. The development of the BAC’s GDP may 
also play a role in the eventual decline of ETA. I also argue that high levels of youth 
unemployment created a larger pool of potential recruits for ETA, contributing to the group’s 




The Basque Country’s economic development follows the general pattern of development 
that mainstream economic theory describes: a transition from agriculture, to manufacturing, and 
then to services becoming the largest sector of the economy. Mikel Gómez Uranga’s book, 
Basque Economy: from Industrialization to Globalization, charts the course of the Basque 
economy throughout history. His work compiles data from the BAC government and banking 
institutions and combines it with historic evidence from the region. He writes that, from before 
recorded history, the Basques were largely a farming people, and agriculture served as the main 
resource in the economy (Uranga 10). In the 18th century, the process of industrialization began 
in earnest in the Basque Country. Iron and metalworking became important industries, and 
Basque companies became exporters of these metal goods (Uranga 11).  
With the end of the Third Carlist War in 1876, the Southern Basque Country was fully 
integrated into the Spanish kingdom and thus the Spanish market (Uranga 14). Despite this 
integration, some aspects of economic autonomy remained. An agreement between the provinces 
of the Southern Basque Country and Spain established a special tax allocation system for the 
Southern Basque Country that no other region enjoyed (Uranga 16).  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, agriculture remained the dominant sector of the 
economy in only one Basque province (Uranga 22). Manufacturing was now dominant across the 
region. Basque industry suffered somewhat under the Second Republic (1931-1936) due to the 
government’s shift away from public works projects (Uranga 23). Even with this downturn, 
industry continued to be the most important element of the Basque economy. The Second 
Republic’s end and the Spanish Civil War created a massive shock to the Basque economy. The 
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economy had to rebuild after the conflict, and it had to do so in a Spain ruled by the dictator 
Francisco Franco. 
The economy under Franco experienced radical changes. Franco’s regime imposed wage 
and price controls on the citizenry and became increasingly controlling over the economy in the 
1940s (Uranga 30). Such widespread government control can wreak havoc on an economy, and 
this is precisely what happened in both Spain as a whole and in the Basque region. Inflation 
became a severe problem. According to Uranga, average wages in the 1940s were 130% of the 
average wage in 1936 (30). Although wages rose, they did not rise fast enough to keep up with 
the inflation brought about by Franco’s economic policies. Official prices reached 593% of 
prices in 1936 (Uranga 30). Black markets emerged to fill the demand for goods, and prices on 
these black markets could be over 1,000% of 1936 levels (Uranga 30). Workers could not afford 
many basic goods, and the standard of living declined greatly during this period (Uranga 30). 
Despite these poor conditions, the Basque economy was eventually able to resume 
growth in part due to orienting toward a new Spanish consumer culture in the 1960s (Uranga 34). 
This trend continued into the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the services sector overtook industry to 
become the largest sector in the Basque Country (Uranga 57). Despite this change, 
manufacturing remained a vital part of the Basque economy. Around the mid-1970s, there was 
“[…] a clear bet on industry [in the Basque Country], a bet on those traditional sectors, such as 
iron, steel, energy and small and medium-sized companies […]” says Jose Luis Curbelo, director 
general of the Basque Institute of Competitiveness (Cooper). Though services were now the 
largest sector, manufacturing did not decline as dramatically as it has in other developing 
economies. Today, the tertiary (services) sector in the Basque Country accounts for 68.3% of 
value added to the economy, while the secondary (manufacturing) and primary (agriculture) 
22 
 
account for 31% and 0.7%, respectively (“Basque Country”). Thus, nearly a third of the 
economy is still dedicated to manufacturing. 
Amid these economic changes, ETA was founded in 1959. A decade and a half later, 
Franco died, and Spain began a process of establishing a constitutional monarchy. The transition, 
however, did not lead to an immediately improved economy. In the mid- to late 1970s, the 
economy suffered greatly. Uranga posits that this poor economic performance in the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1980s was caused by “[t]he international crisis created by the December 1973 Yom 
Kippur war” reaching Spain in 1975 (56). GDP per capita in the Basque Country decreased 
significantly during this period. In 1964 and 1975, Basque GDP per capita was approximately 
109% of the European Economic Community (EEC) average (Uranga 58). By 1985, it had sunk 
to 81.1% of the EEC average (Uranga 58). The Basque economy also suffered relative to the 
national average, going from 142% of the national GDP per capita in 1967 to only 107% in 1987 
(Uranga 61). I discuss GDP and GDP per capita further in the fourth subsection of this section. 
Another dimension of the early, post-transition economy was a massive spike in the 
unemployment rate in both the Basque Country and Spain. I examine the unemployment rate and 
its effects on ETA’s terrorism in the next subsection. 
3.3 Youth Unemployment and Terrorist Recruitment 
The unemployment rate in the Basque Country was nearly 0% before 1975, but this was 
largely artificial. The rate of unemployment during Franco’s dictatorship was kept unrealistically 
low in part because women were very limited in joining the labor force and not counted in 
official unemployment statistics (Uranga 60). It is difficult to say, therefore, how much 
unemployment changed from its true value in 1975 or earlier. Despite these difficulties, 
unemployment at the end of 1976 was 3.45% in the Basque Country according to Spain’s 
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National Statistics Institute (INE). It began to increase rapidly, however, reaching a peak of 
24.06% in 1985. This is a massive level of unemployment. In the United States, for example, 
economists generally call an unemployment rate of about 5% “full employment.” During the 
financial crisis of 2008, unemployment in the U.S. peaked around 10%. During the Great 
Depression, unemployment is generally estimated to have peaked around 25%. Spain’s economy 
has more structural unemployment than the U.S., and the two periods and crises differ in many 
ways. But this still provides a rough barometer for how severe the labor market conditions were 
in the BAC during this time. 
Further still, unemployment remained high for many years. Although the unemployment 
rate declined until about 1991—before peaking near 25% again—it remained above 15% from 
1981 until 1999. This is a nearly twenty-year period with very high unemployment. Figure 3.1 
shows the unemployment rate in both the Basque Country and Spain from 1976 until the 
beginning of 2020. 
 
 















































































































































As Figure 3.1 shows, unemployment in the BAC reached much lower levels in the early 
2000s before spiking again after 2008 until around 2015. This spike can be attributed to the 
global recession caused by the global financial and European sovereign debt crises at the time. 
These shocks caused recessions in economies across the world, and such a spike in 
unemployment was not unique to Spain or the BAC. The growth in unemployment during this 
period was also less severe, and the unemployment rate did not linger at as high a level as it had 
in the 1980s and 1990s. We also see another new trend in the 2000s. Basque unemployment 
grew significantly less than the Spanish level. Indeed, the BAC has had lower unemployment 
than Spain since 1996, but the gap from 2008 onward has been much larger. The BAC’s focus on 
maintaining a strong manufacturing base is credited by some as a reason for the Basque 
economy’s relative strength when compared with Spain (Cooper). 
This is the picture of overall unemployment in the BAC since Spain’s transition to 
democracy. The rate of youth unemployment is more relevant, however, to my discussion of 
ETA’s terrorism. Youth unemployment was much higher than the overall unemployment rate 
throughout this period. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the unemployment rates for youth aged 16-19 
and 20-24 for both Spain and the BAC. Both graphs follow the same trend line as overall 
unemployment but with much higher values. Unemployment peaks in the early 1980s at over 





Figure 3.2: Youth Unemployment (Age 16-19) in the Basque Autonomous Community and in Spain (Source: INE) 
 
 















































































































































































































































































































































Both the high levels of youth unemployment and the direction the youth unemployment 
rate moves are important factors in ETA’s terrorism. A classical economic argument—applicable 
to both crime and terrorism—is that, when faced with poor employment prospects, individuals 
have less to lose by committing crime or joining a terrorist group. When unemployment is high, 
there is a larger pool of such individuals, and in this case, there is a larger pool of potential ETA 
recruits. Youth unemployment is more relevant in this argument because youth tend to have 
fewer skills that are applicable in the job market and tend to be more prone to crime than other 
age groups. But does this theory hold up to scrutiny, and is it truly applicable in the discussion of 
ETA and the Basque Country? 
I argue that the theory holds true in the Basque Country, even though there is still debate 
surrounding the unemployment argument in the literature on terrorism. A 2020 study by 
researchers at Florida International University sought to study the relationship between the labor 
market and terrorism. They found through statistical modeling of terrorist incidents in 127 
countries that neither the unemployment rate nor the youth unemployment rate had a substantive 
effect on the number of terrorist incidents. Rather, they argue, the labor force participation rate 
“has a strong influence on terrorism in the negative direction” (Cruz, et. al. 232). This finding 
drives at the difference between the unemployment rate, which only counts individuals actively 
seeking work, and the labor force participation rate, which is the percentage of those employed 
and unemployed while seeking work out of the total population. 
While this finding still lends merit to the general economic opportunity argument, the 
researchers do not distinguish between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism in their 
analysis. This is an important distinction. If a country suffers from attacks perpetrated by 
terrorists from abroad, it stands to reason that the labor market conditions in that country had 
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little to do with those attacks. Other researchers have made this distinction and focus their 
analyses on domestic terrorism. 
In their analysis of the Middle East and North Africa region, Bagchi and Paul find exactly 
what the theory predicts. Youth unemployment, rather than overall unemployment, has a 
statistically significant relationship with terrorism (Bagchi and Paul 15). They find that, for a one 
unit increase in the youth employment rate, the number of domestic terrorist attacks is reduced 
by 10.7% (Bagchi and Paul 15). Adelaja and George also find in their 2020 study of 126 
countries that the youth unemployment rate has a statistically significant relationship with 
domestic terrorism, and this relationship is positive (48). They also find that “the impact of youth 
unemployment on terrorism increases with the level of grievances” such as “corruption, 
perceptions of government ineffectiveness, and absence of a strong rule of law” (Adelaja and 
George 50). Such grievances, especially perceptions of the Spanish government and its 
legitimacy, were definitely present in the Basque Country in the immediate aftermath of Spain’s 
transition to democracy.  
Finally, Caruso and Schneider also find confirmation of the opportunity cost argument in 
their 2011 study. They focus specifically on Western European countries and state that “the 
classical economic argument of opportunity cost can be confirmed” (Caruso and Schneider 548).    
Their analysis reveals that a 1% increase in youth unemployment led to a 0.5% increase in 
terrorist activity. While a smaller effect than in Bagchi and Pual’s analysis of the Middle East, 
this is still a statistically significant relationship, and the relevance of youth unemployment in 
influencing terrorism is obvious. 
The rapid rise in youth unemployment in the Basque Autonomous Community begins 
immediately after the transition in 1975. It peaks in 1982 for age 16-19 at 72% and in 1986 for 
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age 20-24 at 58%. These peaks are reached in about ten years from a starting point of below 10% 
unemployment. The labor market worsened rapidly, and many youths may have been motivated 
to join ETA during this time. The literature discussed previously certainly indicates that this 
would be the case. Whitfield’s book also offers accounts of Basque youth that were likely to join 
ETA. Youth took part in rioting and street violence, called kale borroka, in the BAC. Initially a 
response to police violence against protests, kale borroka grew in its violence over time and 
came to involve “attack[s] on Basque police and sabotage of public property […] with Molotov 
cocktails and other improvised weapons” (Endgame for ETA 29). Whitfield also writes that the 
“hundreds of youths [that kale borroka] attracted were perceived as likely recruits of ETA” 
(Endgame for ETA 29). Indeed, she goes on to describe how ETA “generally attracted men in 
their twenties” as recruits in the 1970s, but the average age of recruits dropped in the mid-1980s 
(Endgame for ETA 62, 63). 
Youth unemployment was not the only factor in ETA’s development. It is important, 
however, because it provides some insight into the group’s strength. We can assume—at least in 
the early years of democracy—that higher youth unemployment meant ETA had more recruits 
and a larger operational capacity. We can see that from the start of the transition in 1975 until 
1985, when ETA carried out 998 attacks (Global Terrorism Database). This is nearly half of the 
2,024 attacks they committed from 1968 until 2011, and they came at the time that youth 
unemployment was spiking massively (Global Terrorism Database). Figure 3.4 shows the 
number of ETA attacks per year plotted next to the youth (age 16-19) unemployment rate. The 
correlation is strongest in the first years after the transition, and even then, these variables are far 
from perfectly correlated. Over time, the correlation is even less strong. This can be attributed to 
several other factors, including ceasefires that meant attacks decreased dramatically and the 
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increased effectiveness of Spain’s counterterrorism measures as time went on. GDP is another 
economic factor that could play a role in the number of attacks over time, and I examine its 
relationship with ETA’s terrorism in the next subsection. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Youth Unemployment and Terrorist Attacks (Sources: INE, GTD) 
 
3.4 Gross Domestic Product’s Relationship with Terrorism 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of total economic activity for a certain 
region during a certain time period. The Basque Country’s GDP during the 1970s, as discussed 
previously, was decreasing. The region’s GDP per capita sank relative to Europe and to Spain. 
Uranga estimates that, for the whole decade from 1975 until 1985, GDP shrunk in the BAC by 
0.3% (56). This is in contrast to growth of 8.1% from 1960-1975 (Uranga 56). Figure 3.5 shows 
the level of Basque GDP per capita in constant 2015 Euros beginning in 1980. From the mid-
1980s onward, Basque GDP per capita is generally growing. There are only brief periods of 
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Figure 3.5: Gross Domestic Product in the Basque Autonomous Community, 1980-2019 (Source: Eustat) 
 
Relative to the rest of Spain, the Basque economy has recovered from the hardships of 
the 1970s and once again leads the country. Data available from 2000-2019 show the BAC’s 
GDP per capita has been higher than Spain’s for at least the past two decades. The gap between 
them is also growing steadily, with Basque GDP per capita at 122% of the national level in 2000 
and just under 130% in 2019 (INE). This is a remarkable recovery. The BAC was 3rd among 
Spain’s Autonomous Communities in GDP per capita in the early 1970s, but with the downturn, 
had fallen to 6th in the late 1990s (Abadie and Gardeazabal 113). With its current standing at 
130% of national GDP per capita, the BAC is the second wealthiest community in Spain—only 
trailing Madrid (INE). 
Though economic factors are the larger causes of economic downturn in the BAC, ETA’s 
terrorism certainly played a role in economic conditions as well. It is difficult to determine the 
exact extent of ETA’s impact, but there have been several attempts made to estimate these 
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society. He estimates that, between 1993 and 2002, ETA’s extortion of businesses stole 3.8 
million Euros per year—in 2002 Euros (Buesa 4). For the same period, he estimates that—given 
lives lost, destruction of property, and resources spent fighting ETA’s terrorism—ETA’s total 
cost to the economy was 697.4 million Euros per year (Buesa 7). It is worth noting that this is an 
estimate for 9 years of ETA’s campaign, not the group’s entire 40-year campaign. Buesa also 
notes that this figure was about 1% of the BAC’s GDP (Buesa 7). 
Other researchers have tried to estimate the effects on the Basque economy even more 
broadly. Aside from the direct costs of ETA’s terrorism, it stands to reason that the group’s 
existence could depress willingness to invest in the Basque Country and overall economic 
output. Indeed, researchers in one study of the period 1968 to 1991 found that terrorism reduced 
foreign investment coming into Spain by 13.5% (Endgame for ETA 30). Another important study 
by Abadie and Gardeazabal attempts to find the effect of ETA on the BAC’s GDP. Here, the 
researchers use statistical methods to model a “synthetic” Basque Country without terrorism 
against the real Basque Country. They find that “after the outbreak of terrorism, per capita GDP 
in the Basque Country declined about 10 percentage points relative to the synthetic control 
region” (“Economic Costs of Conflict” 114). This gap, they argue is explained almost perfectly 
by terrorism. Whereas Abadie and Gardeazabal find these effects in GDP per capita, researchers 
working with Buesa found the same to be true for just GDP (Myro, et. al.).  
There is some debate surrounding whether these seemingly dramatic changes in GDP can 
be attributed as causal results of terrorist activity. Gries, et. al. for instance, conducted a 
statistical analysis of terrorism and real GDP per capita growth in seven western European 
countries (Spain among them). They found that a negative causal effect of terrorism on GDP 
could only be proven in Portugal (Gries, et. al. 502). At first glance, this does seem odd that their 
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findings do not corroborate those of the researchers mentioned previously. However, this study 
focused on national GDP per capita, whereas the two aforementioned studies were looking at the 
Basque Autonomous Community alone. Therefore, while seemingly contradictory, both findings 
are compatible. GDP in the BAC can be impacted by terrorism even if Spain’s GDP is not, 
especially given that ETA’s terrorism was concentrated so largely in the BAC. 
Gries, et. al. do make another important finding. They find that—for Germany, Portugal, 
and Spain—growth in real GDP per capita has a causal effect on terrorism (Gries, et. al. 503). 
This is another version of the opportunity cost argument. As GDP per capita rises, there is more 
wealth to go around and more for individuals to lose by participating in crime or terrorism. Less 
terrorism occurs as a result. Looking at Figure 3.6, we see the growth rate of GDP per capita in 
the Basque Country. 
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The growth rate may seem at odds with Gries, et. al.’s findings. Growth spikes in the 
mid- to late 1980s, at the very time that ETA’s terrorism is ramping up. It is again important to 
remember that no single indicator will perfectly align with the pattern of ETA’s violence. The 
1980s also saw high unemployment that—as discussed previously—contributed to ETA’s 
violence. An important point in the first few years of democracy is made by Abadie in another 
paper. He finds that “[c]ountries with intermediate levels of political freedom are […] more 
prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly 
authoritarian regimes” (Abadie 51). This finding would seem to indicate that countries 
transitioning from authoritarian to democratic societies (i.e., having intermediate levels of 
political freedom) will see an increase in terrorism (Abadie 51). This effect likely counteracts the 
positive effect of GDP per capita growth in Spain in the 1980s. It is also worth noting the fall in 
GDP per capita growth from the late 1980s into the 1990s. After its lowest point in 1993, there is 
more consistent and positive growth. There are still periods of decline, but the generally positive 
trends in growth—as confirmed by Gries, et. al.—are a contributing factor in the process toward 





4. POLITICAL CHANGES AND THE END OF ETA 
4.1 Introduction 
This section addresses the relationship between ETA and Basque politics. Due to the 
multi-party nature of the Basque parliament, many political parties have come and gone over the 
years in the BAC. I make passing reference to some minor parties throughout this section. There 
are, however, four main political parties that I focus on. The first is the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV). The PNV is the main nationalist party in the BAC. The PNV, is not however, part of the 
group of political parties collectively referred to as the nationalist left. Compared to the PNV, the 
nationalist left has taken more radical nationalist positions and served as a key source of support 
for ETA. Batasuna is the most important party of the nationalist left. In addition to these two 
nationalist parties, the two parties on the political left and right at the national level in Spain also 
have a presence in the BAC. These two parties are the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 
and the People’s Party (PP). In the Basque Country, PSOE is branded PSE for Basque Socialist 
Party. 
Founded in 1895, the PNV has long fought for Basque independence (Leonisio 45). With 
one exception, the PNV has been the largest party in the governing coalition in the Basque 
Parliament since Spain’s transition to democracy. In general, the PNV has sought a more 
moderate approach toward nationalist goals, often described as accommodationist rather than 
secessionist. Batasuna, on the other hand, was often viewed by many as ETA’s political wing 
and has represented a more extreme view of Basque nationalism (Elias and Mees 141).  In 2002, 
the Spanish parliament went so far as to pass a law outlawing Batasuna because of alleged ties to 
ETA (“Difficulties of Ending” 6). This ban was upheld by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2003 
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(Leonisio 46). Despite not being able to stand for election, the party’s leadership continued to 
play a role in negotiations with ETA. In 2010, Batasuna leaders formed a strategic alliance with 
the minor nationalist party, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), that had splintered off from the PNV in 
1986 (Murua 103). Another minor nationalist party joined them to form an electoral coalition 
called EH Bildu, which Spanish courts allowed to enter elections in May 2011 (Murua 103). The 
transition from Batasuna to EH Bildu is indicative of changes on the nationalist left as ETA 
began to decline.  
I explore this transformation and the nationalist left’s electoral outcomes in the next 
subsection. I examine election results in both the Basque and national parliaments in the pre- and 
post-2011 periods. My focus is on the PNV as the center-nationalist party and Batasuna/EH 
Bildu as the main force of the nationalist left. I also look at which minor parties have come and 
gone over time. All these dimensions provide some insight into how BAC politics responded to 
ETA, especially in examining changes since 2011. Later in this section, I look at the role that the 
nationalist left played in ETA’s ultimate end. I also examine aspects of political normalization 
following ETA’s ceasefire to determine what the immediate effects of the group on BAC politics 
were. I then discuss what developments can be observed in the new, post-2011 political climate. 
4.2 Electoral Outcomes 
At the national level, the BAC is currently afforded eighteen seats2 in the lower house of 
the Spanish legislature, the Congress of Deputies. In the most recent election in 2019, the PNV 
won six of these seats. EH Bildu won four, and the left-wing parties PSE and Podemos (another 
Spain-wide party) won four and three seats, respectively. The Partido Popular won the remaining 
seat (“Elecciones generales”). With only 18 seats to examine, and the BAC’s political pluralism 
                                                 
2 From 1977-1989, the Basque delegation in the national parliament had 21 seats. From 1993-2004, it had 19 seats. 
The delegation has had 18 seats from the 2008 election until the present. 
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reflected in the results, it is difficult to draw decisive conclusions from the national level 
elections. EH Bildu won four seats in the two elections prior to 2019; Batasuna won 4 seats at its 
peak in the 1980s as well (“Elecciones generales”). The most notable difference for the 
nationalist left was in 2011. A predecessor to EH Bildu, a coalition with the name Amaiur, won 6 
seats in the national Congress that year, amid high turnout for the nationalist left (“Elecciones 
generales”). This was more national seats than the PNV won that year. I discuss the 2011 and 
2012 elections in greater depth later in this section, but it may be the case that voter enthusiasm 
was high with ETA’s ceasefire, leading to Amaiur’s strong performance. Since then, however, 
EH Bildu has won fewer seats than the PNV at a national level. 
The BAC Parliament, in contrast with the more balanced distribution of seats in the 
Congress of Deputies, has been historically dominated by the PNV. In the 75-seat body, the PNV 
has held the most seats of any one party in all but one session in parliament—1986 (“Elecciones 
regionales”). The PNV has also been kept from the governing coalition of the BAC parliament 
only once, in 2009 (Leonisio 46). That year, the PSE and PP held enough seats to govern 
together in an odd coalition between conservatives and socialists (Leonisio 51). The PNV 
reclaimed its place in government in the following election, leading a minority government 
rather than forming a coalition (Fortes and Peréz 495). 
The lack of significant variation of represented parties in the regional parliament provides 
good opportunities for analyzing changes when they do occur. The two biggest changes we see 
in the principal nationalist parties—the PNV and Batasuna—are the PNV’s loss of government 
in the Basque Parliament in 2009 and Batasuna’s illegalization and return in the form of EH 
Bildu. Both of these developments in regional politics have links to ETA’s activity. 
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In the 2009 elections for the BAC Parliament, the PNV actually gained a seat more than 
it had in its coalition with EA in the prior election of 2005 (Leonisio 48). This put the party’s 
total at 30 of the parliament’s 75 seats (Leonisio 48). Despite this being the largest total for a 
single party, there were not enough seats with minority nationalist parties for the PNV to form a 
majority coalition. Nationalist left candidates, formerly with Batasuna, had been banned from 
running for office in 2009 (Leonisio 48). Because of the ban, these candidates told their 
supporters to cast a null vote in the election. These null votes amounted to 8.8% of all votes cast 
and would have counted for seven seats had they been for a party that could stand for election 
(Leonisio 48). Without these nationalist left candidates, the PSE was able to gain seven seats, 
going from 18 in the prior election to 25 in 2009 (Leonisio 48). The PNV failed to reach an 
agreement to govern by coalition with the PSE, and ultimately, the socialists formed a majority 
coalition with the 13 seats of the PP (Leonisio 53). This right-left coalition was only possible 
with the blank ballots not counting for a nationalist party. While not a reflection of the public’s 
response to any PNV policy toward ETA, the action of banning the candidates was taken because 
of links to Batasuna and ETA. Were the group not a factor, the PNV would almost certainly have 
been able to remain in government. 
In the 2012 election, the PNV returned to power in a minority government, despite losing 
three seats (Fortes and Pérez 496). The PSE lost a large share of the vote it had earned in the 
previous election, as economic factors were more decisive in this election than nationalist 
objectives (Fortes and Pérez 495). The debt-to-GDP ratio in the Basque Country had grown, and 
unemployment had doubled since the start of the PSE-PP government’s term (Fortes and Pérez 
497). While the loss of support for the socialists is credited with returning governance to the 
PNV, the 2012 regional election was also the first time that the new party of the nationalist left—
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EH Bildu—was in the running. EH Bildu received 25% of the vote in the Basque Country, and it 
became the second largest party in parliament with 21 seats (“Elecciones regionales”). This is the 
largest share of the vote that a single party of the nationalist left had ever received. In 2020, EH 
Bildu broke its own record, earning 27.86% of the vote—although still only earning 21 seats in 
the regional parliament (“Elecciones regionales”). EH Bildu has thus cemented its place as the 
second-largest party in the Basque Country. Importantly, it performs better than Batasuna ever 
did while ETA remained active. Such performance for a single party of the nationalist left was 
unfathomable during ETA’s campaign, and the rise of EH Bildu would seem to indicate the 
negative political effects ETA had on the nationalist left. 
Trends in the smaller nationalist parties can also inform about the public’s perception of 
ETA and how the nationalist left movement has shifted over the years. As time went on, some 
smaller parties that backed ETA faded, while new ones that rejected terrorism gained ground in 
the Basque parliament (Leonisio 47). Tejerina echoes this idea with the observation that “every 
time a ceasefire was declared and elections were held, support for the nationalist left coalitions 
increased […] and when the ceasefires were suspended and elections were held, the support fell” 
(15). We see this with Batasuna in 2001. Prior to the 1998-99 peace talks, they had 14 seats in 
the Basque Parliament, but their presence shrunk to only seven seats in 2001 (“Elecciones 
regionales”). Aralar is another important example. The party—ostensibly on the nationalist 
left—rejected ETA and grew in electoral stature as the nationalist left that still did not condemn 
ETA declined (Leonisio 47). 
4.3 The Road to ETA’s End 
Many factors played into ETA’s decline, and authors such as Benjamín Tejerina, Teresa 
Whitfield, and Imanol Murua argue that one key element in this decline was a loss of support for 
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ETA on the nationalist left. They argue that a loss of public support for these parties ultimately 
led to an internal struggle within the nationalist left over whether ETA was in their best interest. 
This subsection summarizes this argument and the events that occurred along the road to ETA’s 
end. I demonstrate that this loss of support was the main effect of Basque politics on ETA and 
that it led to the group’s downfall. 
Dealing with terrorism, or trying to govern despite it, consumed most of the BAC 
government’s time since Spain’s transition to democracy. In 1988, the PNV spearheaded the Pact 
of Ajuria Enea—the first major anti-ETA movement within Basque nationalist politics. This 
agreement was signed by every Basque nationalist political party except for Batasuna, and it 
condemned terrorism and ETA’s activities (“Difficulties of Ending” 5). It marked the first time 
that the near entirety of the Basque nationalist movement called for ETA to end its campaign of 
terror. ETA’s violence generally declined over the course of the 1990s, but it did not disappear. 
The Spanish government continued to take counterterrorism measures against ETA. While the 
pact condemned terrorism, the continued persistence of ETA created pressure on the PNV and 
other nationalist parties to take concrete actions that would help towards the group’s end (Elias 
and Mees 144). 
In 1998, the nationalist parties took a new approach to ETA that critics denounced as 
backtracking on their agreement from the previous decade. This new strategy was outlined in the 
Pact of Lizarra, which called for a peace process like the one established in Northern Ireland 
(Esser and Bridges 64). This led to a nearly year-long ceasefire as ETA and Batasuna pursued 
such a process with the Spanish government. ETA was also motivated to offer this ceasefire so 
the parties of the nationalist left could take the time to define a “more aggressive nation-building 
strategy” (Murua 95). The effort towards a peace agreement was ultimately unsuccessful. In late 
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1999, ETA called off the truce and resumed its attacks in 2000 (Murua 95, 96). For many, this 
was an instance where the PNV and the nationalist left establishment were too willing to tolerate 
and take advantage of ETA’s violence in pursuing a political move toward independence. There 
was aggressive criticism directed toward the PNV by the media and non-nationalist parties for 
their perceived role in negotiating with terrorists (Elias and Mees 145). 
The PNV, for its part, did try to offer another solution—although attempting to further 
the goal of Basque independence in doing so. This attempt came in 2004. The Ibarretxe Plan, 
named for the BAC president at the time, proposed a method of gradually dissociating the BAC 
from Spain. Proponents framed the plan as the only way to de-escalate conflict with ETA. The 
Basque president’s essential argument was that the plan “would leave the terrorist group […] 
with no justification for its existence” because the Basque Country would be nearly independent 
from Spain (Muro 457).  The plan proposed that powers reserved for the central government 
under the current statute of autonomy be extended to the Basque regional government over the 
course of several years. The region would ultimately become a “freely associated state,” in a 
confederation-style relationship with Spain. This would have been very close to outright 
independence, with the Basque Country even having the ability to sign its own bilateral trade 
agreements with other countries (Muro 457). Defense, customs, and foreign policymaking would 
become the only powers kept for the central government under the plan (Muro 457).  
Unsurprisingly, this plan was not enacted. The Spanish constitution requires that any 
change to an Autonomous Community’s statute of autonomy be proposed by the autonomous 
government and then agreed to by both houses of the Spanish Congress. It was here that the plan 
met great resistance, with both the Spanish Prime Minister and opposition leader condemning it 
(Muro 458). That same year, six other autonomous communities were able to reach agreements 
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on new statutes of autonomy with the Spanish government (Muro 462). Among those six was 
Catalonia, another region well known for seeking independence from Spain. The success of these 
communities indicates that reforming a statute of autonomy is not impossible; the Basque 
proposal simply went too far in the eyes of the Spanish government. In the end, the BAC’s 
statute of autonomy remained unchanged from its ratification in 1979 and has remained so ever 
since.  
Shortly after the failed Ibarretxe Plan, another attempted negotiation between the central 
government and ETA took place in 2006 (Esser and Bridges 65). It was the failure of these talks 
to produce a result that was the final blow in the nationalist left’s support for ETA. Prior to this 
point, ETA held a dominant position over the political and civil institutions in the Basque 
nationalist left. ETA was viewed as the “vanguard” of the nationalist movement by these other 
actors (Murua 97). Although formal ties did not exist between ETA and nationalist left political 
parties, there was a tacitly shared strategy on the nationalist left “defined as political-military” 
where ETA had “exclusive authority to decide on its military strategy and actions” (Murua 97). 
This is not to say there was no tension between the nationalist left political establishment and 
ETA throughout the group’s history. As described previously, the Pact of Ajuria-Enea and the 
Pact of Lizarra were points of contention between the nationalist left and ETA. Even still, ETA 
always demanded exclusive authority to negotiate over “military” matters during peace talks.  
Because of this relationship, an ultimate loss of support for ETA among nationalist left 
political parties was a key factor in the group’s decline and final ceasefire. Nationalist left 
political parties decided after the 2006 talks that the configuration with ETA in charge may not 
be most beneficial. As Tejerina writes, the nationalist left began a “progressive questioning of 
the strategic line [that had been] adopted four decades prior in a completely different social and 
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political context” (15, my translation). As a result of this questioning, the political-military 
strategy was ultimately abandoned. The nationalist left, as mentioned in the Introduction, agreed 
that ETA should no longer lead the movement. Important figures of the movement, along with 
many others, signed the Guernica declaration in February of 2010 to call on ETA to declare a 
ceasefire (Murua 103). ETA gave up its armed activity that year, declaring its ceasefire publicly 
in 2011. Nationalist political parties thus became the main force of the nationalist movement. 
This change provides us with a clear break in time where nationalist parties prior to 2011 had to 
contend with ETA and after 2011 did not. By examining the differences in Basque politics 
between these time periods, we can infer what effects ETA had on political processes in the 
BAC.  
4.4 Normalization and Going Forward 
It almost goes without saying that the principal effect of ETA on BAC politics was 
disruption of the normal political processes by political violence. It is intuitive, therefore, that 
one of the most significant changes after 2011 is political normalization. In this subsection, I 
address what we can observe as evidence that political normalcy has finally arrived in the BAC. 
Given these changes and the fact that ETA is no longer an obstacle, I examine how the Basque 
nationalist left and the PNV have sought to further their goals since ETA’s ceasefire. 
One of the clearest signs of political normalization can be seen in the Basque public 
opinion poll, the Euskobarómetro (BasqueBarometer). This poll has been conducted by the 
University of the Basque Country (UPV) for decades, providing clear historical trends in 
response to their questions. Their data about public attitude towards ETA show that there has 
been dissatisfaction with the group for a very long time. Most of the BAC’s population has 
totally rejected ETA since 2001 (UPV). A plurality of the population has done so since 1987 
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(UPV). In 2011, the year ETA declared a permanent ceasefire, the number that totally rejected 
ETA stood between 60 and 64% (UPV). This is a far cry from the 23% that totally rejected ETA 
in 1981, and this shift in opinion points to a generational shift in the BAC and a general feeling 
that ETA’s violence was no longer productive. 
The change in opinion about ETA is, interestingly, not a reflection of a dramatic shift in 
feelings about Basque independence. About 35% had no desire for independence in the most 
recent poll from 2018 (UPV). Those that had a very large or somewhat large desire for 
independence were just under 30% (UPV). This group only recently dipped below the “no 
desire” group, and as Figure 4.1 shows, there is not a dramatic change over time in any of these 
responses. Those with a very small or somewhat small desire for independence made up about a 
quarter of respondents in 2018. Taking the two “strong” groups together, more Basques favor 
independence than do not. This is important because it shows that ETA’s demise was not caused 
by a lack of support for independence. It indicates that a rejection of ETA’s methods rather than 
its goals caused the dissipation of support for the group. This supplements earlier discussion 
about the nationalist left. There is clearly strong pro-independence support in the Basque 
population, and this public opinion is consistent with the electoral results EH Bildu has 
experienced. The poll showing high levels of rejection of ETA also goes toward explaining how 
the nationalist left suffered at the ballot box as a result of ETA and was ultimately compelled to 




Figure 4.1: Desire for Independence in the Basque Autonomous Community (Source: Euskobarómetro) 
 
 





















































Finally, the most obvious change we can observe in the Euskobarómetro data is fear of 
participating in politics. This poll shows that, although the data fluctuates from year to year, most 
people had some level of fear of participating in the political process. A sudden and sharp 
increase in those reporting no fear begins around 2009, and the number that expressed a high 
level of fear decreased. This can be seen in Figure 4.2. By 2009, ETA’s activity was limited, and 
this trend took off after 2011 when the official ceasefire was announced. This points to the 
changing nature of politics in the BAC no longer affected by the fear of ETA’s violence. 
Whitfield provides a succinct account of the changed politics of the BAC in her book. She says 
that: 
candidates had campaigned [in 2012] with unprecedented freedom. [They] held rallies in 
the heart of San Sebastián’s casco viejo, something unthinkable with ETA still active. 
The Basque PP opened street-level party offices for the first time in its history, and the 
candidates […] participated in a televised debate as if such ‘normal politics’ were a 
regular occurrence. (Endgame for ETA 287) 
 
With “normal politics” in full swing, were Basque nationalist parties able to further their 
goals? Evidence is mixed. The attempted reforms to the Basque Statute of Autonomy discussed 
in the last subsection failed during ETA’s campaign, and it would stand to reason that progress 
could be made in this area in the group’s absence. While there are some interesting observations, 
there has not been any attempt on a similar scale. This steady development in further increasing 
the BAC’s autonomy has come while the pro-independence movement in Catalonia has been 
much more active. In 2017, the Catalan government attempted to hold a referendum for citizens 
to vote on independence from Spain (“Catalonia’s bid for independence”). The referendum was 
declared illegal by the Spanish government, and prominent Catalan politicians were arrested. 
Basque nationalists will surely have been watching these events with great interest. 
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As for the expansion of Basque Autonomy, there has been some development through the 
implementation of the statute of autonomy. The powers guaranteed to the BAC government were 
not bestowed immediately upon the statute’s ratification in 1979. Rather, they have been 
transferred over time. Most of these transfers occurred within the first 10 years of the statute of 
autonomy taking effect. There was another round of implementations in the 1990s and then 
another in from 2009-2012. In this period, 2011 was the year with the most transfers—12 
(“Competencias y transferencias”). In 2018, another round of transfers began. The 2009-2012 
period marked the first transfers in a decade, and they occurred as ETA was ceasing to be a 
threat to the political process. This is likely an indication that, without ETA in the picture, the 
Spanish government was more willing to meet the desires of Basque nationalists who pushed for 
more autonomy. 
According to Basañez, the BAC legislature has held discussions as recently as 2019 on 
how to approach another attempted reform of the Statute of Autonomy (310). As of yet, such 
discussions have not produced a resolution toward this end that would begin the same process as 
the Ibarretxe Plan did in 2004. A more significant milestone is a still to be transferred power 
under the Statute of Autonomy—the management of prisons. Because of ETA’s activity, the 
Spanish government never transferred this power to the Basque Autonomous Community. 
Indeed, the central government distributed prisoners suspected of being ETA operatives to 
prisons across the country (Endgame for ETA 73). The issue of prisons, family visitation, and 
prisoner health was a contentious one throughout ETA’s campaign. Although not yet complete, it 
has been announced at the time of this writing that—in April 2021—the Spanish government 
will be including operation of the penitentiary system in a batch of powers to be transferred to 
the Basque government (“Transferencia de prisiones”). This both illustrates the progress that has 
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been made since ETA’s ceasefire, as well as the lengths still to go. It took nearly a decade for 
prison management to be transferred to the Basque government, and as of 2019 it was estimated 




This thesis investigated the Basque Autonomous Community’s economy and political 
environment during Spanish democracy in both the absence and presence of the terrorist group, 
ETA. In the broadest of terms, my goal was to analyze the effects of both the economy and 
politics on ETA and vice versa. By looking at the time periods during and after ETA’s campaign, 
I was able to identify what changes in the post-ETA period could be attributed to the group. I 
summarize the relationships between these elements and ETA below. 
The Basque economy had profound effects on ETA. As many scholars have previously 
argued, I find that ETA was a politically motivated group whose downfall was driven by a loss 
of political support. The addition I make to the literature about ETA’s campaign, however, is 
recognizing that economic performance in the BAC is another critical component in explaining 
the group’s longevity and ultimate demise. Poor economic conditions created high 
unemployment in the BAC that coincided with a contentious political climate during Spain’s 
transition to democracy. High levels of unemployment—especially youth unemployment—
created a larger pool of potential recruits for ETA. Over time, unemployment decreased, and 
ETA grew weaker as it had both fewer recruits and had to deal with more pressure from Spain’s 
counterterrorism measures.  
ETA also affected the economy, and this is very intuitive. A terrorist group suppresses 
economic output and growth in many ways. The best studies conducted on the matter find an 
approximate reduction of 10% in Basque GDP per capita and GDP because of ETA’s terrorism. 
In terms of the immediate cost of ETA, research has estimated that ETA cost Spain 
approximately 700 million Euros per year in 2002 Euros (Buesa 8). Today, this would be over 
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900 million Euros per year. More research could be conducted in this area to determine what 
other elements of ETA may have caused further economic disruption.   
The post-2011 economy suffered from the global recession that took place in 2008 and 
the European sovereign debt crisis that had long-term effects in both the BAC and Spain as a 
whole. Despite the recession and increase in unemployment, the crisis was not as severe in the 
Basque Country as past economic downturns in the late 20th century. In terms of both 
unemployment and GDP per capita, the BAC outperformed the national average. It is likely that 
ETA’s absence was not the sole cause of this improved relative economic performance. It is true, 
however, that the negative effects attributed to ETA were no longer present. The group’s absence 
was, therefore, likely a factor in the BAC achieving such remarkable performance. 
Domestic terrorism also has a profound impact on the politics of the area in which it is 
concentrated. ETA was one of the most important political issues in the BAC for decades. 
Failure to resolve the crisis for many years hampered the ability of Basque nationalist political 
parties to pursue political solutions to the question of Basque autonomy. We see evidence of this 
in the elections that immediately followed ETA’s permanent ceasefire. The nationalist left—the 
pro-independence collection of parties closest to ETA—had its best performance in both national 
and regional elections after the ceasefire. Many minor parties of the nationalist left evolved over 
time and shifted toward opposing ETA because they would lose support at the ballot box when 
ETA’s activity increased. 
The nationalist left’s transition to opposing ETA took some time. As far back as 1988, all 
the nationalist parties except Batasuna condemned ETA and called for an end to their violence. 
This was an important moment in an increased expression of opposition to the group. Many were 
dissatisfied that the nationalist left did not go further than this, and these critics were further 
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disappointed when nationalist parties made an agreement to facilitate negotiations between ETA 
and the Spanish government in 1998. Despite the seemingly softer stance toward ETA, this was 
still a stop on the road to full rejection of ETA and demonstrated that the nationalist left political 
establishment held some power over ETA.  
The nationalist left was the core group that supported the political-military strategy for 
Basque independence. The beginning of the end for ETA was marked by these political entities 
taking a more critical view of terrorism and pushing ETA toward ceasefire after the failed 
negotiations with the Spanish government in 2006. Nationalist parties had high hopes for these 
talks and blamed the lack of success on ETA after the group’s bombing of Madrid’s airport in 
spite of the active ceasefire. The electorate was increasingly opposed to ETA, and the nationalist 
left could not attach themselves to the group for much longer. This shift within the parties on the 
nationalist left was a key force in ETA’s permanent ceasefire in 2011. 
Basque nationalist politics is in a new stage since ETA laid down their arms. The terrorist 
campaign is no longer a distraction to the movement’s political goals, and the PNV and others 
can focus on governing the region. Unlike the independence movement in Catalonia, however, 
the BAC has not taken any dramatic step to push for independence since 2011. Some progress 
has been made in the extension of autonomy to the BAC, but there are still many powers that 
remain to be transferred to the regional government. At the time of this writing, this is the most 
apparent way in which Basque Autonomy is being expanded, and important powers such as the 
management of prisons are scheduled to soon be given to the BAC by the central government. 
What other directions nationalist politics take as time goes on remains to be seen. 
Further research is needed to determine the deeper effects of ETA on Basque society. In 
some respects, a decade since the ceasefire is still too soon to determine what new phenomena 
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are a result of the ceasefire. With more time and more analysis of the social, political, and 
economic factors affected by ETA, we can learn more about the group’s impact on the BAC. 
This thesis is thus an attempt to lay the foundation for this work and to orient research towards 
the post-ETA period instead of only focusing on the lifespan of ETA. For now, I have 
determined the key effects of ETA on the Basque economy and political institutions and vice 
versa. These findings provide insight into how the Basque Autonomous Community and the 
Basque nationalist movement are moving forward now that decades of political violence are 
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